This paper develops a model of earnings and applies this to an examination of the effect of lifelong learning on men's employment and wages. Using data from the British Household Panel Survey, a variant of the mover-stayer model is developed in which hourly wages are either taken from a stationary distribution (movers) or are closely related to the hourly wage one year earlier (stayers). Mover-stayer status is not observed and we therefore model wages using an endogenous switching regression, extended to take account of non-random selection into employment. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood, using generalised residuals to correct for possible endogeneity of lifelong learning decisions and with unobserved heterogeneity captured by a mass point approach. Methodologically, the results support the mover-stayer characterisation since the restrictions required for the simpler specifications popular in the literature are rejected. Substantively, simulation of the estimated model shows statistically significant effects of lifelong learning on wage income at all initial levels of education. The influence of lifelong learning on the probability of employment is an important component of the overall return.
Introduction
In a number of advanced economies it has become increasingly common for people to undertake lifelong learning, that is a period of study after the completion of formal education. For example, Holmlund et al. (2008) report that in 2002 just over forty per cent of Swedish university entrants had completed secondary school more than five years earlier, while only about one third progressed to university within one year of completing secondary school. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, about thirty per cent of both men and women with a degree-level qualification by age twenty-nine acquired it after having had a break from full-time education (Purcell et al. 2007 ). In 1994, 31 per cent of new undergraduates were aged twenty-five or over; by 2007 this proportion had risen to 43 per cent (Higher Education Statistics Agency 1995 , Higher Education Statistics Agency 2008 . Using a much broader definition of lifelong learning the UNESCO Institute for Lifelong Learning (2009) indicates that in the United Kingdom over fifty per cent of adults aged twenty-six to forty-five report recent participation in some form of adult learning or education, with a participation rate of forty-one per cent for people aged forty-six to fifty-five and 21 per cent for people aged fifty-six to sixty five.
Individuals may participate in lifelong learning for various reasons; one motive may be a desire to progress in the labour market. However, evidence on the effectiveness of lifelong learning is mixed. In the United States, Light (1995) reports a range of penalties to interrupted education; these depend on the number of years of education before the interruption, the duration of the interruption and the total number of years of education. Holmlund et al. (2008) come to similar conclusions for Sweden although they also suggest that the penalty erodes with time. In contrast, Ferrer & Menendez (2009) suggest that, in Canada, graduates who delay their education receive a premium relative to those who do not. Adult learning is particularly common in the United Kingdom; in 2004 more than 15 per cent of 30-39 year-olds were students, a higher level than in any other OECD country (OECD 2009 ). Here too, though, it is not clear that such learning brings benefits in terms of increased earnings potential. Egerton & Parry (2001) report substantial penalties for late learners while Jenkins et al. (2002) find little evidence that qualifications gained between the ages of 33 and 42 increase hourly wage growth for men. de Coulon & Vignoles (2008) , on the other hand, find a positive wage effect of qualifications acquired between the ages of 26 and 34, which varies depending on the level of qualification. Blanden et al. (2012) also provide evidence of long-term positive wage impacts of lifelong learning but suggest that, for men especially, these are slow to appear).
A common feature of the analyses mentioned above is that they estimate the impact of lifelong learning on those who are in work. In doing so, they ignore the effect that such learning may have on the probability of being employed. This may be particularly important where individuals have temporarily left work in order to gain further qualifications. Furthermore, restricting the estimation sample to those with observed wages in all periods can introduce selection bias.
In this paper, we develop a model of wages that incorporates a participation decision and allows the evolution of individuals' wages to be influenced by whether they achieved any qualifications through lifelong learning, by their prior employment status (which is also affected by lifelong learning) and by a range of background characteristics. Our modelling approach allows some people to receive a wage that is a random draw from a stationary distribution, while others have a wage that is closely related to that of the previous year. Conceptually, this is a variant of the mover-stayer model (Goodman 1961) and the econometric framework we develop builds upon earlier research applying the model to income dynamics (Dutta et al. 2001 ). The first group -those whose wage is a random draw -are 'movers' in the sense that their position in the wage distribution is (conditionally) unrelated to their previous position. The second group are 'stayers' by analogous reasoning and, intuitively, might be interpreted as having a more stable wage trajectory. Essentially, the model allows wages to be estimated using linear regression, adjusted for employment status (which is observed) and whether the individual is a mover or a stayer (which is unobserved and is therefore identified probabilistically). In the case of movers, the regression is in levels while for the stayers the regression is in differences. As such, both cross-sectional wage equations and wage equations in first differences are nested within our more general model.
Our analysis suggests that both of these popular specifications should be rejected in favour of our more general model. This result compounds the findings from Dutta et al. (2001) who showed that the mover-stayer structure offered a better means of understanding income inequality in the UK than did other popular specifications. Additional methodological innovations of the model are that we allow for unobserved individualspecific effects on movers' wages and the probability of employment and that we address the potential endogeneity of lifelong learning.
The paper also makes contributions on the substantive front. The results further our understanding of the effectiveness of lifelong learning. Our model is sufficiently flexible to allow identification of the routes by which lifelong learning might affect wages. Specifically, it becomes possible to assess not only whether lifelong learning affects wages directly but also whether it has a role in assigning individuals to be movers or stayers and thereby have their wages subject to differing sets of influences. We also capture the effect on employment and how this influences subsequent outcomes. Existing analyses of lifelong learning (e.g. Blanden et al. (2012) ) do not permit such detailed insights. We base our analysis on the British Household Panel Survey, a nationally representative longitudinal survey dataset spanning the period from 1991-2007. The paper has the following structure. The next section describes our data and the pattern of lifelong learning shown by them. In section 3 we set out our econometric approach and argue that, given the multivariate nature of our model, simulation methods have to be used to derive results showing the effects of lifelong learning on earnings. Section 4 presents these results, showing the effects of lifelong learning on the discounted value of present and future earnings. In section 5 we discuss the relationship between our findings and other related work. Section 6 concludes.
2 Wages, employment and lifelong learning in the British Household Panel Survey
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) started in 1991 and is an annual survey of each adult member of a nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 households (around 10,000 individuals). Among other things, it provides information on employment status, pay and hours worked and educational attainment on a continuing basis. It is a longitudinal survey with the same individuals interviewed in each successive wave.
If an individual leaves the original household, that individual together with all the adult members in their new household will also be interviewed. Children become eligible for interview when they reach the age of sixteen. The sample thus remains representative of the British population as it changes through the 1990s and 2000s. We focus on data collected from the original sample households over seventeen waves from 1991 to 2007. Members of these households are repeatedly surveyed regardless of changes to household membership. In common with most analysis of wages (see, for example, Dickens (2000) , Ramos (2003) , Cappellari & Jenkins (2008) , Ulrick (2008) , Meghir & Pistaferri (2004) and Lillard & Willis (1978) ), we consider only men. We limit ourselves to men aged twenty-five to sixty in order to concentrate on working lives beyond completion of the conventional period of education. Thus, for those younger than twenty-five in 1991 or older than sixty in 2007, we consider only the data they provide while in this age range. We drop observations where individuals report themselves as self-employed because of the difficulties in defining their hourly wages. We also ignore those who provide proxy responses or whose data are incomplete while they are in this age range. Our sample is confined to those who respond in successive waves -where there is a break in response, that individual only features in our estimation sample up to the wave in which that break occurred. Finally, we trim the data to remove the observations whose reported hourly wages fall into the top and bottom 1% of the distribution.
In our analysis we define lifelong learning as the acquisition of any qualifications after the age of twenty-five. This age threshold was chosen in order to allow for a period to elapse following the completion of full-time education for most people. We focus on qualification acquisition rather than participation in training since this is more fully recorded in the data but also since this has merit in its own right. We look at the effects of lifelong learning in each of the last five years and also if it has been undertaken since our respondent entered the sample, i.e. since 1991 or after reaching the age of twentyfive, whichever comes later. In our econometric work we look only at wage dynamics from 1996 onwards; this means that we have a full record of lifelong learning in the last five years for everyone in our sample. We also know whether they have undertaken it since 1991 or, if later, since they reached the age of twenty-five. The BHPS does not, however, tell us about people who undertook lifelong learning before the first wave of the survey in 1991. The resulting estimation sample is made up of 8,098 observations, relating to 1,135 men. Table 1 shows how this sample is derived from the full BHPS sample.
In view of the substantial sample reduction, it is appropriate to consider how inference based on this estimation sample should be regarded. As a prelude to this, we note that it is standard in empirical studies of wages to impose sample selection criteria. As noted in the Introduction, it is common to exclude the self-employed from studies of wage dynamics (as we do in this paper) but also to restrict analysis to those who are in work at all points in time (a restriction avoided in this study). While the selection of the estimation sample used in this paper is less restrictive in this regard, there are other regards in which it is more restrictive (for instance, we exclude individuals observed for five waves or fewer).
Nevertheless, the fact that our estimation sample is just under one quarter the size of the original sample for the relevant age group means it is appropriate to consider the representativeness of our results. Some consequences of the sample selection are obvious. The fact that we keep only men aged 25-60 and then exclude those observed for five waves or fewer means that it is the wages of men age 30-60 that provide the focus for the study; this is necessary in order to ensure that we have adequate history to be able to identify lifelong learning events, but it results in a loss of over one third of the sample in the relevant age range. The wages of men under thirty do not feature in our analysis and may well be characterised by different dynamics. Other implications of the sample selection criteria are less immediately apparent. We exclude the selfemployed because of difficulties defining their wages. In fact, because of another sample selection criterion -including only consecutive responses -dropping a single year due to self-employment means that we retain observations on individuals prior to the point of first being self-employed. It may be that individuals choose self-employment because of obstacles to finding work as an employee. Alternatively, it may be that those who change jobs more frequently -and so are more likely to be movers -are also more likely to try self-employment at some point. In any event, dropping observations from the point of self-employment onwards may result in disproportionately discarding movers. As another possibility, if our treatment of outlier wages results in dropping individuals who in fact do have large wage variations, the sample will end up under-stating the degree of earnings mobility.
As with all studies of this type, it is possible, therefore, that the approach taken to sample definition may introduce an unknown form of selection bias. Dealing with this satisfactorily would complicate the analysis in a way which is not practical and is not further addressed in this paper. We do however consider the issue of attrition from the sample and present some findings in the empirical section of the paper that suggest that this does not materially alter our main conclusions.
The pattern of lifelong learning
The BHPS provides very detailed information on qualifications. These were classified to match the national scale which ranges from 0 (for those with no or only minimal qualifications) to 5 for those with post-graduate degrees. The system was originally designed to represent national vocational qualifications (NVQs) but academic qualifications have also been calibrated against it, allowing most qualifications to be represented on an equal basis. Table 2 shows this classification. In common with other work ( e.g. de Coulon & Vignoles (2008)) we merge categories 4 and 5; we have also treated all GCSEs as being in category 1. The table also indicates the number of people gaining qualifications in our sample. These data relate to the 16,702 observations of 2,259 men in the penultimate column of table 1. While they show over one thousand qualifications gained, a substantial proportion of the sample gained more than one qualification. Thus 1,749 men did not report any qualifications, 268 gained one qualification, 112 reported two qualifications and 130 reported three or more qualifications over the period that they were in the survey. Much the largest category of qualifications gained is "other". However, table 2 also shows considerable importance of City and Guilds qualifications. Sub-degree higher education qualifications (HNC/HND or university diploma) are more common than university degrees, while not many respondents report gaining GCSEs or A-levels. Acquisition of qualifications does not, of course, mean that someone's educational attainment, as represented by the level of their highest qualification, increases. We distinguish acquisition of qualifications without any increase in educational attainment from upgrading of educational attainment in our subsequent analysis. Table 3 provides a summary picture of the extent of lifelong learning in terms of the qualification levels shown in table 2. The data here relate only to the 8,098 observations of 1,135 men for whom we have observations for five years or more; this provides a picture of the prevalence of lifelong learning. The main panel of the table compares individuals' highest current qualifications when first observed to their highest qualification five years later. This captures the prevalence of lifelong learning that results in qualification upgrading. The first row below the transition table shows the probability of upgrading to be fairly evenly spread across qualifications levels (the somewhat smaller rate for those with level 2 qualifications is based on a small sample size). We note that those with level 4 qualifications cannot upgrade, by definition. A very different impression is formed when considering the incidence of lifelong learning, regardless of whether this resulted in a qualification upgrade (the row labelled "Lifelong Learning"). Here there is a clear gradient. Among those with no qualifications, about 10 per cent will undertake some learning. This is substantially higher for those with a level 1 qualification (17 per cent) One might expect that those with the lowest initial qualifications would have the most to gain from lifelong learning, and that therefore the prevalence would be highest for those educated to levels 0 or 1. There are a number of reasons why this might not be the case but it is possible only to speculate about them. Perhaps most obviously people who are already reasonably well-educated may be better aware of the opportunities available to them than those who are poorly educated. But it is also possible that less-educated people may have difficulties in managing the costs associated with gaining qualifications 1 or that they may believe that their capacity to benefit from further qualifications is limited. Finally, these figures show only the proportions of people who have actually gained qualifications and not those who have embarked on courses, but not completed them satisfactorily. For obvious reasons surveys do not ask people about qualifications they have worked towards but failed to obtain. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that differential drop-out or failure rates could explain more than a part of the differences in prevalence.
There is a risk that people who embark on lifelong learning may drop out of the BHPS. That might seem a substantial risk if most lifelong learning involved moving away from home to attend a college or university. But table 2 suggests that only about 8% of lifelong learning qualifications are university qualifications and data from the Higher Education Statistics Authority indicate that in the academic year 1999/2000 86% of first-year students aged twenty-five and over were part-time students. Such students will not face the same reasons as full-time students to move away to go to university, and are therefore much less likely to be lost from the survey. Thus, while it cannot be established definitively, it seems unlikely that the participation prevalences shown in table 3 are importantly affected by attrition.
Employment, wages and lifelong learning
The BHPS did not introduce an explicit question on hourly pay until wave 8. However, in all waves it asks employees to give information on the number of hours they work in a normal week and the number of hours they worked as overtime. The survey also collects usual monthly earnings before tax and other deductions in employees' current main job 2 . For all waves, we derive each employee's gross hourly wage as follows:
hourly wage = monthly earnings 52 12
× (weekly regular hours + 1.5 × weekly overtime hours)
We use the calendar year average of the Retail Price Index excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX) to deflate nominal wages to 2007 prices. We refer to this deflated variable as the hourly wage. Table 4 provides a summary of average hourly wages and non-employment rates for the men in our sample, differentiating between those with no lifelong learning, those who undertake lifelong learning without upgrading their highest level of qualification and those who do upgrade their highest level of qualification as a result of lifelong learning. This shows that wages mostly increase with qualification level. Employment probabilities also increase with qualification level when considering those who do not undertake lifelong learning but no such smooth pattern is evident among those with experience of lifelong learning. More directly of interest is the apparent effect of lifelong learning on wages and employment. Lifelong learning with no qualification upgrade is associated with higher wages, for those with qualifications at level 2 or lower. Where qualifications are upgraded as a result of lifelong learning, the apparent premium is larger. This is particularly the case for those initially with level 2 qualifications. However, it remains true that it is among those with qualifications at or below level 2 that the strongest effects are seen. It is also among this group that lifelong learning without qualification upgrade appears to have the highest impact on the probability of being employed; this is particularly striking for those with no qualifications. Lifelong learning that involves an upgrade to qualifications is also associated with higher employment probabilities, except among those initially with a level 3 qualification. These increases are not as great as those associated with lifelong learning that does not involve a qualification upgrade. It would, nevertheless, be a mistake to conclude from the While intriguing, such descriptive statistics can only offer a partial insight into the effect of lifelong learning. To proceed, we need to use econometric methods.
Econometric analysis
In this section, we discuss in more detail the mover-stayer model, describe the econometric approach and present estimation results.
A Mover-stayer Framework
We develop a modelling approach which allows us to study employment and wage effects jointly. This approach applies the mover-stayer framework to the wage distribution. The idea is that movers can be distinguished from stayers. The former receive a wage rate possibly very different from what they had previously earned -they move about the wage distribution. The latter, by contrast, stay at much the same point in the wage distribution as they had been when last employed; thus their wages are closely explained by their previous wage rates.
There are a number of possible reasons why people might be movers. Perhaps the most obvious is that they lose their jobs and have to take whatever the labour market offers, with or without a period of unemployment in between. But they may also be people who have been in stagnant jobs with little prospect for progression who have the good fortune to come across more favourable labour market opportunities. Or people who have done reasonably well but still find that a better opportunity has come along. Being a mover need not even be associated with a change of employer. It is perfectly possible that people will move from one post to another offering sharply better pay with the same employer. It is rather less likely that someone's wage rate will fall sharply while they remain with the same employer, if for no other reason than such a change would be likely to appear as constructive dismissal. Nevertheless, one might expect to see some connection between being a mover and a change of job.
While there may be a number of ways in which movers and stayers could be defined, the approach we adopt is that movers are assumed to receive a wage rate set by a standard Mincerian wage equation, equation (2), in the levels of wages. For these movers the wage rate of the previous period has no bearing on the current wage rate except, of course, insofar as both are affected by the same individual characteristics, such as the level of education. For stayers by contrast, the idea that the wage rate is closely related to that of the previous period points naturally to their wages being determined by an equation of the form of equation (3), in the first difference of log wages.
There is no observed characteristic which makes possible a precise distinction between movers and stayers. Rather we assume that the process is driven by a latent variable; it is thus determined statistically, in much the same way as it is commonly assumed that employment is driven by a latent variable. The estimated model allows us to determine the probability that particular observations are those of stayers rather than movers or vice versa just as a probit model can be used to identify the probability that someone will be employed.
A complication arises with those individuals who were not employed in the previous period. One option would be to constrain such cases to be movers by definition. However, this ignores the possibility that someone may leave employment and later return to earn at a similar level to before. We design our model in such a way that such cases are free to be either stayers or movers. Since the equation for stayers is in first differences, we require a measure of wages in the previous period. We proxy this by wages when last observed.
Our model can be seen as a switching regression in which the two distinct states cannot be identified except through estimation of the model and is of the type first discussed by Quandt (1958) . Over and above this, however, we have to extend the model to take account of selection into employment.
The model encompasses the standard first differences model if i) there are no selection effects from employment present, ii) all hourly wages of people who were not employed in the previous period can be explained by the movers' equation and iii) all hourly wages of people employed in the previous period can be explained by the stayers' equation. We test the restrictions this implies in section 5.
A virtue of the first differences model is that it removes individual-specific effects associated with the level of earnings. This issue re-emerges since our movers' equation is set out in the level of log wages. We describe in the next section how we specify the movers' equation to include variables that capture unobserved heterogeneity. We also allow for the fact that people who study for lifelong qualifications may have different earnings capacity from those who do not study. We address this issue by including generalised residuals calculated from a preliminary ordered probit equation. These terms allow us to control for potential endogeneity effects. The significance of the adjustment terms provide a test of endogeneity.
We now set out the components of the mover-stayer model. The choice of explanatory variables is discussed subsequently in section 3.8.
Movers
For movers, wages are given by a stationary Mincerian equation
where y it represents log hourly wages deflated by the retail price index and X it is a vector of variables which influence the wage rate. Such variables include age, qualifications, lifelong learning, region of residence and log real GDP per capita. Thus, for a mover, the wage rate is not directly related to previous wages except insofar as the variables which influence the wage of a mover have also influenced their wage on the previous occasion when they were a mover. An individual-specific effect, m i ∈ © m 1 , m 2 , ..., m K ª , is included to capture the influence of unobserved characteristics on wages. As discussed below, this provides a discrete approximation to the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.
Stayers
The hourly wages of stayers are assumed to be related to those of the previous period. We specify the stayers' wage equation in first differences as
It should be noted that there is no loss of generality in specifying the vector of driving variables X it to be the same in both equations; provided it is general enough, differences in specification can be accommodated by restrictions on the elements of β 1 and β 2 . Since this equation is estimated in differences, the individual-specific effect on the level of wages is swept out.
Switching
A respondent is a mover if the indicator variable I it = 1 and a stayer if I it = 2. This indicator is driven by the latent variable, I * it . The probability, P it that observation y it is drawn from (3) rather than (2) is driven by the latent variable
with
Selection into Employment
We address the issue of selection into employment in the following way. Someone is employed if the indicator J it = 1 and not employed if J it = 0. This indicator is driven by the variable
W it is a vector of variables which drives the employment choice. An individual-specific effect, e i ∈ © e 1 , e 2 , ..., e K ª , is included to capture the influence of unobserved characteristics on the probability of being employed.
Lifelong Learning
Our analysis needs to take account of the consequences of the endogeneity of lifelong learning decisions. We distinguish lifelong learning which results in upgrading qualifications from lifelong learning which results in no such upgrade. Someone undertakes lifelong learning with upgrading if K it = 2, lifelong learning without upgrading if K it = 1 and does not do so if K it = 0. This process is driven by the latent variable
Estimation Strategy
The model has the following likelihood function:
We allow the error terms to be freely correlated across equations and assume a multivariate normal distribution:
Note that σ 12 is not estimable (Maddala 1983, p. 224 ) since individuals cannot be simultaneously in two states. Consider the case of I it = 1. The truncated normal density is
where Φ() represents the cumulative standard normal distribution. Integrate over ε it , η it to get the marginal truncated density for u 1it
where ρ 1ε = σ 1ε σ 1 and ρ 1η = σ 1η σ 1
. Since ρ εη = σ εη we can write
Doing the same kind of thing for the case of I it = 2 results in
Substituting back into the likelihood function, the denominator terms cancel out giving:
This likelihood contribution includes the individual-specific effects m i and e i . These can be integrated out. To do this, the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is approximated by a finite number, M, of pairs of mass points in the mover and employment equations. The specification characterises men as represented by one of these M pairs, each of which occurs with probability p m . This is tantamount to allowing the population to be made up of M types of men. Each type of man differs but every man of a given type is identical with regard to those unobserved characteristics thought to influence wages and employment. The number of types of men, M, is unknown; we were able to consider up to four such types. Writing the likelihood contribution for man i of type m at time t, his unconditional contribution to the likelihood at this time is:
This approach to controlling for individual-specific effects is flexible in the sense that it avoids the need to assume a particular distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. It implies a correlation between the unobserved influences on movers' wages and the unobserved influences on employment. Other authors have used this as a means of tackling selection bias when considering, for example, the effect of unemployment duration on earnings (Gaure et al. 2012) .
The effect of lifelong learning can be examined by including an appropriate variable among the regressors in each of the equations in the model. However, the possibility of lifelong learning decisions being endogenous needs to be addressed. Thus the estimation needs to take account of possible correlations between ν it in equation (6) and the errors in the four equations (2 to 5) of the main model. Ideally, this would be dealt with by jointly estimating all five equations. However, to avoid the computational burden involved with higher-order normal integrals we use instead a two-step approach. This follows in the spirit of Kim (2004) who considers the case of a Markov switching model with an endogenous continuous regressor in the outcome equations (the equivalent of our ∆y it and y it equations). The full covariance matrix can be written
Applying a Cholesky decomposition, we can recast the error terms in such a way that the correlation structure is maintained:
where (ω 1it, ω 2it, ω 3it, ω 4it, ω 5it ) are independent standard normal variables. This allows our model to be written in reverse order as:
Here K it,j are dummy variables which take the value 1 if K it = j and 0 otherwise (j = 1, 2); ∆ kj (L) are lag operators with k indicating the equation number (so that ∆ kj (L)K it,j = P l * l=1 δ kj,l K it−l,j with l * the maximum lag length). The tildes indicate the removal of K it from the respective regressor set. Endogeneity of K it,j stems from their correlation with ω 1it . We can substitute this out to give
Kim's approach addresses the case of a continuous endogenous regressor and involves including a residual term from the regression of the endogenous variable on instrumental variables uncorrelated with the error terms in the outcome equations in order to overcome the endogeneity-induced bias. The significance of the estimated coefficient attached to the residual term provides a test of endogeneity. Our case is slightly different in that the potentially endogenous regressor -the acquisition of a lifelong learning qualification, possibly involving an upgrade to qualification level -is categorical rather than continuous. Following Vella & Verbeek (1999) and Orme (2001) , we replace the (K * it − V it ϕ) with the generalised residual from the K * it regression,ν it . Sinceν it is correlated with ω 1it but not with ω kit for k > 1, inclusion of this term as a regressor in each of the other equations controls for the endogeneity of K it . Since the ω kit terms are independent standard normal, our model becomes: As with the linear case, the coefficients on the generalised residual terms provide a statistical test of endogeneity.
The model is estimated using maximum likelihood on a pooled dataset. As well as including mass points in the employment and movers' equations in order to capture the effect of unobserved heterogeneity, the effect of correlation across waves for individual respondents was addressed by allowing for clustering in the computation of standard errors. Strictly, therefore, we maximise a log pseudolikelihood.
Variables used in the analysis
The main variables of interest are those that relate to lifelong learning. We are concerned with both the short-and long-term effects of lifelong learning and wish to distinguish people who upgrade their level of qualification from those who gain qualifications but at a level equal to or below those of their existing highest qualifications. Ideally, we would like to distinguish between levels of upgrade. However, our ability to do so is limited by the relatively small number of people observed to upgrade their educational status.
With this aim in mind, we set up a range of dummy variables to reflect lifelong learning history. Acquired t−i takes a value of 1 if someone acquired a qualification between the interview year t − i − 1 and the interview year t − i (2 ≥ i ≥ 0) whether they upgraded their educational status or not, while Upgraded t−i takes a value 1 if they acquired a qualification which upgraded their educational status; otherwise these variables take the value of 0. These dummy variables allow us to identify the effect of qualifications achieved in the previous year, the year before that or at some earlier point. Acquired t−3+ and Upgraded t−3+ indicate that a qualification was acquired (with or without upgrading) and that someone upgraded three or more years ago. Ever Acquired and Ever Upgraded indicate that a qualification was acquired or that upgrading took place at any time in the past 3 . Beyond this, theory has little to say about what might be included as explanatory variables in equations 2 to 6 and our strategy is therefore to include variables to control for sources of variation within our sample which may be correlated with gaining qualifications as a result of lifelong learning. These variables include: qualification level when first observed; a dummy variable indicating whether the highest qualification at that time was academic or not; age; whether from an ethnic minority group or not; partnership status (couple vs. single adult household), the presence of children (represented by a 0/1 dummy variable); region (using dummies to indicate the region within Britain people live in); whether the individual was employed when first observed; whether a new job was started within the last year; GDP or its change as an indicator of the state of the economy; and the time between interviews.
The effect of rising overall prosperity is controlled for by including the growth rate of GDP in equations 3, 4 and 5 -the wage equation for stayers, the switching equation and the employment equation. The logic behind this is that the rise people receive if their real wage is linked to that of the previous year may depend on overall economic performance, as may the probabilities of them being a stayer and of being employed; we use GDP growth to represent overall economic performance. By contrast, we expect the wage rate of movers to depend on the ability of the economy to pay, and this is indicated by the log of the level of GDP rather than by its rate of change.
The variables mentioned in this sub-section are either exogenous (age, ethnic group, wave of survey) or relate to an earlier time period in order to reduce concerns about endogeneity.
Identification
Identification is achieved both through exclusion restrictions and our treatment of unobserved heterogeneity. We control for the selection effect arising from the fact that we only observe wages for workers by including family background variables -whether partnered at time t − 1 and whether children were present in the household at that time -in the employment equation only. The intuition behind this exclusion restriction is that individuals within a couple are able to specialise into paid and non-paid labour, depending on their preferences and comparative earnings potential, and the advantage of such specialisation becomes greater when there are dependent children. Consequently, household composition may influence labour supply decisions but should not affect wage rates except insofar as these depend on past employment history.
However, there may still be a concern that household composition is correlated with unobservables that do affect wage rates. Our treatment of unobserved heterogeneity is therefore important as a second means by which we address possible selection bias. The model captures the correlation between unobserved influences on employment and unobserved influences on movers' wage rates (unobserved influences on stayers' wages are differenced out). As noted above, this provides a source of identification that has been exploited by other authors (Gaure et al. 2012) . The switching equation alone includes the variable Wave Gap which indicates the interval between interviews and a variable Recent Job indicating whether the current job has started since the previous interview. Here, the rationale is that people are more likely to be movers if the gap between interviews is long than if it is short and that those with a recent job are more likely to have experienced a wages shock that would be likely to classify them as movers. Finally, the equation used to estimate the generalised residuals includes dummies for individual years. These capture trends over time in participation, beyond that which may be influenced by the business cycle (GDP growth is included as separate regressor). The idea behind this is that these year dummies capture exogenous shifts in the policy towards lifelong learning such as those which resulted from the report In Demand: Adult Skills in the 21st Century (Performance and Innovation Unit 2001).
A related issue is Ashenfelter's dip. It is possible that selection into learning is driven by a transitory reduction in earnings that, in the absence of the learning, would be meanreverting. If so, the estimated effects of learning on earnings will be upward-biased, conflating the effect of learning with the mean-reversion. To address this possibility, we include lags of employment status in the employment equation as well as in the lifelong learning participation equation. This is in line with Heckman & Smith (1999) who suggest that the dip in earnings arises as a result of unemployment dynamics rather than reduced wages and that matching estimators that control for prior labour market histories can substantially reduce the extent of bias.
Attrition and the Final Model Specification
As table 1 makes clear, the data set from which we estimated our model is subject to attrition; we begin with 1048 observations and in the final wave have 359 observations. We can correct for this in the manner suggested by Wooldridge (2002) . We estimate a duration model which explains the probability of someone dropping out of the sample as a function of their educational level and the survey wave. This allows us to calculate their survival function; the probability that they remain in the sample up to (or beyond) a specified survey wave. Multiplying the reciprocal of the survival function by the individual's sampling weight when first interviewed provides an overall weight to be attached to the observation as a correction for non-response. Details of the way in which this is done and its implications for our estimates of the returns to lifelong learning are provided in appendix A.
Parameters of the Mover-Stayer Model
Our main results for the four mass-point model are presented in table 6. The parameters of the ordered probit equation which generates the generalised residuals are shown separately in appendix B.
Initial investigation suggested that, for the wages of movers and stayers and for employment, the effects of qualifications did not depend on the time elapsed since they had been acquired. For the switching equation we rejected the hypothesis that the effects of both types of qualifications were independent of the time elapsed since acquisition. However we were able to accept the hypothesis for upgrading. The test statistics for each of the four equations are shown in table 5. In our parameter table we show coefficients only for Ever Upgraded.
Acquisition of qualifications has a significant effect on the wages of movers, adding 0.061 log units. It also reduces significantly the probability of being a stayer in the first and second year after acquisition of the qualification. Employment prospects are significantly enhanced. Upgrading has an effect on the wages of stayers, increasing their annual rate of change by 0.017 log units per year; this effect is significant at a ten per cent level. At first sight, it seems surprising that the wage benefits of upgrading are significant for stayers but not movers, since one might imagine that upgrading is more likely to involve a spell out of the labour force. In fact, 82 per cent of those who upgraded in a given year were employed in the previous year (the same proportion as for those who did not upgrade). Furthermore, looking across all years, many of those men observed to have participated in lifelong learning at some point, did so in years prior to those covered by the estimation sample. For lifelong learning overall, 44 per cent was prior to the sample period and for lifelong learning resulting in a qualification upgrade the corresponding rate was 41 per cent. Despite the fact that table 4 shows that the nonemployment rate of people who have upgraded their qualification level is higher than that of those who have not done so, upgrading has a small, but insignificant, positive effect on employment prospects. A factor contributing to this apparent contradiction is that initial employment status, Employed at Start, of those who subsequently upgrade was, in our pooled sample, 87 per cent while for those who do not upgrade it was 91 per cent. With a coefficient of 0.598 on the dummy which represent initial employment in the employment equation and a dummy of 2.164 on the dummy representing employment status in the previous period, this probably plays an important role as a differential determinant of employment.
The original level of qualifications has a significant influence on the wages of movers; the coefficients on those educated to levels 1, 2 and 3 are, at 0.210, 0.240 and 0.288, not very different, albeit increasing in the qualification level; the coefficient on education to level 4 on the wages of movers is, however, substantially higher. The probability of being a stayer is also affected by qualification level, with the effects significant for levels 2 to 4, and increasing in qualification level. Level 4 education has a significant effect on the wages of stayers and those whose highest qualification is academic show significantly more wage growth as stayers and are significantly less likely to switch from being stayers to movers. Education does not have a significant effect on employment, which might be something of a surprise. However, given the differences in the proportion of people not employed as a function of education shown in table 4, it is likely that the effects of education are fully represented by their effects on initial employment status.
Age has a significantly positive linear and negative quadratic influence on both the earnings of movers and on the probability of employment; the effect on earnings of movers accommodates the relationship normally found between age and wages themselves. Men who are not white earn significantly less (0.195 log units) than white men and are also significantly less likely to be employed. Working in the public sector is associated with a significant wage premium for movers; there is a slight negative effect on the earnings of stayers, but this is not statistically significant.
Being newly employed, e.g. after a period of non-employment, has a significant negative effect on the earnings of movers, and people who have recently changed jobs are significantly more likely to have experienced wage dynamics which lead to them being seen as movers. Past employment history is a powerful and significant influence on the probability of employment with recent past employment making current employment much more likely; as noted earlier being employed when first observed also has a positive influence on the probability of employment. This effect generates an employment dynamic which means that the full consequences of acquiring a qualification can be assessed only by simulation.
Details of the probabilities of the mass points are provided in table 7. These are estimated in logit form in order to ensure the resulting probabilities are bounded by 0 and 1.
Finally, exponentiating the log standard error terms at the bottom of table 8 shows the standard error of the mover equation to be 0.21, while that of the stayer equation is 0.11. We also note the significant correlations between the residuals in: the stayers' wage equation and the switching equation; the employment equation and the switching equation; and the stayers' wage equation and the employment equation.
These parameters provide an indication of what is important in each of the individual components of our model but they do not allow us to answer the question this paper is designed to address: what is the effect of lifelong learning on men's lifetime earnings? To examine that we have to put our equations together and estimate the impact of lifelong learning taking account for example, not only of any influences of qualifications on wages conditional on men working but also of any influence of lifelong learning on the probability that men work. Our parameters suggest that qualification acquisition influences the latter. But since being newly employed after a spell of not working can have a damaging effect on wages, represented by the coefficient on newly employed in the movers' wage equation, this offers a further route by which qualification acquisition may affect lifetime earnings.
All these influences can be taken into account only by simulating the overall model represented by the equations of tables 6 to 8. This also allows overall effects to be estimated with the correct standard error. It is not, of course, only the standard errors of the lifelong learning coefficients that are relevant here; rather, the covariance structure of the parameter set as a whole must be used. In the following section we present simulations which provide the key results of this paper. In table 9 we show the returns to life-long learning generated by the model shown in tables 6 to 8. Table 9 shows the percentage increase in discounted expected earnings from the age at which the qualification is acquired to age 60; a discount rate of 5% p.a. is used. The results are generated by repeated simulation of the experiences of a panel of 10,000 men over the life course. 480 simulations 4 were carried out in order to provide the indicators of the distribution of the expected return. For each simulation the parameters of the model were drawn randomly from a multivariate normal distribution whose means are those shown in the tables and whose variance is given by the estimated covariance matrix of the parameters. In these random draws there is a risk that the resulting covariance matrix of the shocks to the four equations of the model is not positive definite. Draws with this property were replaced by new draws. Individuals were randomly assigned a pair of mass points in a way that retained the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity implied by the coefficients for that simulation. This assumes the mass points are independent of observed characteristics; something that is required since we cannot observe the mass point for any individual. The draws presented are for men who were employed at the start of their lives and have been employed in all of the three years before they reach the age of thirty. The men are assumed to be white, with children until they are forty-five years old and not working in the public sector. The regional effects are replaced by an average dummy calculated as the population-weighted mean of the number of observations in each region. The results did not appear to be greatly affected, however, by the assumptions made about the population.
Results are presented for men showing the returns as functions of their initial level of education, the age at which they gain lifelong qualifications and whether they upgrade their qualification level or not. Three types of calculation are carried out. The first shows the overall effect on the present discounted value of future earnings, taking account of the full wage and employment dynamics generated by the model. The second set of results allows us to isolate the direct effect of differential employment rates; it shows what the returns would be for men who earned the wages actually generated by the model but were employed in every subsequent year. The third shows the effect on the assumption that people are movers every year; thus the wages calculated are always drawn from the movers' equation; the switching equation is in effect suppressed.
The first part of the table suggests returns to lifelong learning which are statistically significant at the 95% level. Returns are larger for men age 45 than for those aged 30; while the reasons for this are discussed subsequently, it does not, of course mean that the absolute value of the discounted benefit is larger, since the return is enjoyed for fewer years. It is the absolute value of the return rather than the percentage return which influences the incentive to acquire qualifications. Except for men with level 0 education, the returns are higher for those who upgrade than for those who gain an extra qualification at the same level; it is, however, unlikely that this difference is significant. Overall central estimates of the returns shown are substantial and the subsequent parts of the table clarify what lies behind them.
The second part of the table allows us to separate the employment effects from the wage effects by showing what the returns would be for men who were consistently employed whether they had gained qualifications or not. Here the returns are much lower. Qualification acquisition leads to a benefit of around 7% for the 30-year old men and 6% for the 45-year old men. These values reflect reasonably closely the coefficient of 0.061 in the movers' equation of table 6. The returns are higher for those who upgrade because of the coefficient of 0.017 on upgrading in the stayers' wage equation. It is also noteworthy that, while the full effects show higher returns for men aged 45 than for those aged 30, this part of the table shows the opposite. The explanation of the higher return shown by the full effect comes, therefore, from the impact of the qualifications on employment. Late in working life employment rates decline and the impact on the marginal probability of employment generated by our model becomes greater. This benefit is also, of course, present in the calculations for men aged 30, but discounting means that the impact of them on the computed returns for the older population is more marked.
Finally the third part of the table shows us what the returns would be if everyone's wage rate were determined by the movers' equation in each period. It can be seen that this has little impact on the returns to men who do not upgrade. However, for those who do upgrade, the wage progress arising as a result of the effect of a qualification upgrade on the earnings growth of stayers is an important component of the benefit of lifelong learning. This again reflects the coefficient on upgrading in the stayers' wage equation in table 6. The switching equation suggested that men who were qualified initially to level 1 or more were more likely to be stayers than those with level 0 qualifications. So the effect should be expected to be more marked for those with level 1 qualifications or better and that is indeed the case.
These results may be affected by sample attrition. We therefore present, in table 12 of appendix A, the analogous results computed after adjusting for effects of nonresponse as described in section 3.10. The effects shown there are slightly smaller but the differences from 
Comparison with Other Approaches
An obvious question is how the switching regression adopted here compares with other approaches used to explore earnings dynamics. While retaining the pooled structure used here, the model allows us to compare our results directly with models which rely on treating everyone as either movers or as stayers. The simulations presented in section 4 identify, for each individual simulated, whether he is a mover or a stayer. This is determined on a probabilistic basis as described in section 4. If these probabilities were found to be close to zero, that would suggest that a model defined in terms of the log level of wages, like the movers' equation (2), would be appropriate. If the probabilities were found to be close to 1, that would suggest that a model defined in log differences like the stayers' equation (3) would be appropriate. Intermediate values suggest that the more general framework set out here is to be preferred to either of these two special cases. We show in table 10 the probabilities as calculated from the simulations for those who have not done any lifelong learning, presenting, as before, confidence intervals based on the distribution of the individual simulations. The table shows the mean probability of being a stayer, averaged over the age range thirty to sixty; the probability of being a stayer tends to increase with age. But the general conclusion to be drawn from the table is that the hypothesis that the movers' equation in log levels is appropriate for everyone is firmly rejected, while the hypothesis that the stayers' equation is appropriate is clearly rejected; for those educated to level 4 the probability of being a stayer is not, however, far below 1.
A more general issue is how our estimates of returns to learning compare with those of other researchers. Blanden et al. (2012) (2008), working with the British Cohort Study found effects of qualification acquisition on the wages of men aged 26-34 ranging from 10-30% depending on the qualification gained but with the lowest returns for level 3 qualifications. They did not distinguish men who upgraded their qualification levels from those who did not do so 5 and did not examine selection effects. While they did not investigate the relationship between the returns to qualifications and initial qualification level, they did suggest that the effect of gaining an NVQ2 level qualification was higher for people with low ability than for the population as a whole. These effects are rather more powerful than our own, at least if one focuses on our results for people who are fully employed. However, they do not suggest that our results are implausibly large.
Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the effect of lifelong learning on men's earnings using data from the British Household Panel Survey. We have done this using a model of wage evolution structured round a switching regression, with the conventional approach to such a regression equation being extended to take account of endogenous employment effects. Our results offer a more positive view of the effects of lifelong learning on hourly earnings than has been found by some other researchers. We find that acquiring qualifications boosts earnings, particularly where such qualifications are at a higher level than those held previously. This effect operates both by increasing wages directly and through employment effects. The results demonstrate that studies that fail to pay attention to employment effects neglect an important channel by which lifelong learning raises earning power. The existence of two regimes for wage determination is strongly supported by the results and this structure permits a more nuanced understanding of the role of lifelong learning than is possible under the more usual approach of assuming a single wage equation. It carries with it the implication that a single equation approach is mis-specified.
As noted in the Introduction, it is common for government policy to encourage lifelong learning. In the UK, explicit targets for skills development were set out in an official review of skills needs (Leitch Report 2006) . Presented as a means of increasing productivity, growth and social justice, the recommendations are for skills upgrading at all levels and for continued progression for those in the highest skills group.
Our ability to explore the effects of different types of qualification is limited by the data. However, the results of our analysis speak to the importance of acknowledging the distinction between simply acquiring a new qualification and acquiring a qualification that results in a demonstrable and visible skills upgrade.
A Appendix: The Effects of Attrition
We write the hazard of attrition (the probability of dropping out of the sample in wave w given survival up to w − 1) as θ (wQ) = 1 − exp ¡ − exp ¡ φ (w) + κ 0 Q ¢¢ , where w ∈ {2, 3, .., W } is the wave of interview and Q is a vector of qualification dummies. Note that this is a rather parsimonious specification, allowing for the hazard to vary wave-on-wave and, in addition to differ with qualification level and whether the highest qualification is academic rather than vocational. Regional dummies were initially included but subsequently dropped since the test of their joint insignificance could not be rejected (p-value of 0.14). The survival function can be expressed as
(1 − θ (w)) so the overall weight for individual i at wave w can be written
, where wt i1 is the sampling weight for individual i when first observed. The contribution to the likelihood function for individual i becomes
where
Having made this correction, we found that weighting interacted with the estimation process limiting our ability to estimate the model with the preferred number of mass points. Without any correction for nonresponse, we were able to estimate a model with four mass points,. but with the correction in place, it was not possible to examine the effects of the correction for attrition with more than two mass points. Nevertheless, comparison of these two models can indicate whether our results are likely to be substantially affected by sample attrition. Table 11 shows the estimated parameters of a complementary log-log equation used to model the attrition hazard. Table 12 shows the rates of return calculated from the model estimates after using this model to estimate the probability of attrition for each respondent and making the appropriate adjustment for the effects of attrition. Details of the parameters underlying these rates of return are available on request.
B Appendix: The Decision to Undertake lifelong Learning
In Table 11 : The Attrition Equation (Other Qual ) which do not fit into the grading scheme, notwithstanding that these had no influence in our wage equations and were omitted. The probability of men undertaking lifelong learning is not age-dependent. Being employed at the start of the survey or at age 25 (Employed 1991) increases the chance of undertaking lifelong learning. 
